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Perceptual decision-making may be viewed as a process of integrating sensory evidence over time to a
response threshold. Ludwig et al. (2005b) argued against an integration to threshold account for saccadic
eye movement decisions based on data from a stochastic contrast discrimination task. They argued that
evidence integration was time-limited, with the deadline being independent from the quality of the sen-
sory evidence. In this study, the data from Ludwig et al. (2005b) were ﬁt with a model in which sensory
evidence is integrated to a time-varying threshold. The functional form of the threshold variation allowed
the model to approximate a constant threshold as well as an abrupt deadline. Sensory evidence was com-
puted on the basis of a temporally blurred representation of the stimulus sequence. The model provides
an overall good ﬁt to the latency and accuracy data. Its predictions are consistent with a short window of
evidence integration, as proposed in the original study. The model produces qualitatively correct predic-
tions for an experiment in which the availability of sensory evidence is varied systematically. Inspection
of the model parameters, however, shows that integration was not terminated by an abrupt deadline,
although a rather gradual deadline signal improved the ﬁt for some observers.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Studies of the neural basis of (perceptual) decision-making have
highlighted a role for mechanisms that integrate sensory evidence
over time in order to come to an informed decision (reviewed in
Gold & Shadlen, 2001, 2007). Temporal integration is a particularly
useful strategy when there is noise or uncertainty in the sensory
signal and system. For instance, in a typical paradigm the observer
views a random dot kinetogram (RDK) in which only a subset of
dots moves coherently in one direction. Motion discrimination
thresholds and the time needed to make a decision typically de-
crease as the signal-to-noise ratio of the RDK increases (Cook &
Maunsell, 2004; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005; Roitman & Shadlen,
2002). These ﬁndings have been modelled using neural mecha-
nisms involved in programming the motor response that integrate
the evidence provided by upstream sensory areas up to some crite-
rion level of evidence (Ditterich, 2006a, 2006b; Huk & Shadlen,
2005; Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003).
In the psychological domain, models based on the accumulation
of evidence over time have a long and rich history (Brown & Heath-
cote, 2005; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; LaBerge, 1962; Laming,
1969; Link & Heath, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998;
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith, 1995; Smith & Vickers, 1988; Usher
& McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970). Although a wide variety of
models exist that differ in their precise assumptions and dynamics,ll rights reserved.they share the common idea that some noisy internal signal is inte-
grated over time until a decision criterion is exceeded. The broad
class of sequential sampling models may be regarded as a natural
extension of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) to the
temporal domain. Whereas detection theory assumes decisions
are based on a single noisy sample of the information, sequential
sampling models assume multiple (noisy) samples are acquired.
This extension allows these models to account for response time
in addition to choice.
Integration to threshold models have also been used to account
for distributions of saccade latencies in a variety of tasks (Carpen-
ter & Williams, 1995; Hanes & Carpenter, 1999; Ludwig, Gilchrist,
& McSorley, 2005a; Ludwig, Mildinhall, & Gilchrist, 2007; Reddi,
Asrress, & Carpenter, 2003; Reddi & Carpenter, 2000). However,
in a recent paper Ludwig, Gilchrist, McSorley and Baddeley
(2005b) reported evidence from a saccadic choice task that ap-
peared inconsistent with integration of sensory evidence to thresh-
old. In their task observers were presented with patterns that
ﬂuctuated in luminance contrast over time (in 25 ms steps). One
of the patterns had, on average, higher contrast than the other
and the observers’ task was to respond to the high contrast patch
(Caspi, Beutter, & Eckstein, 2004, see also). An illustration of the
stimulus is provided in Fig. 1A. As with the RDK, the stochastic nat-
ure of this stimulus enables more accurate decisions to be made
the more temporal samples are taken into account. By relating
the noise in the patterns to the saccadic choices on a trial-by-trial
basis, Ludwig et al. (2005b) were able to show that only the lumi-
nance samples in the ﬁrst 100 ms were taken into account when
choosing between the patterns (Fig. 1B).
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Fig. 1. The temporal noise paradigm (Ludwig et al., 2005b, experiment 1). (A) Two patterns ﬂuctuate in contrast by drawing a new peak contrast from a Gaussian distribution
every two video frames. The observer has to look at the pattern that is, on average, of higher contrast (top-right in this example). Only 3 out of a total of 80 video frames are
illustrated. (B) Illustrative data from one observer. Shown are logistic regression weights that indicate the importance the observer attributed to the stimulus information
over time. The characteristic pattern is that only the ﬁrst 100 ms appear to contribute to the decision making process.
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so that the mean contrast of the two patterns only differed in a
100 ms ‘‘critical window”. This window was placed either right at
the beginning of the temporal sequence or after an initial 100 ms
had passed. Under these conditions, good performance was main-
tained when the critical window was presented early, but perfor-
mance fell to chance when the critical window was presented
late. This ﬁnding suggested that observers did not extend their
integration window in the face of weak sensory evidence (the late
critical window condition) to enable more accurate decisions. As
such, the results appeared to discount an integration to threshold
account of saccadic decisions in this particular context. Ludwig
et al. (2005b) proposed that the eye movement decisions were
based on integration of sensory information up to an internally
set deadline (corresponding to 100 ms of stimulus information).
Instead of adjusting the integration period on a trial-by-trial basis
in accordance with the quality of sensory evidence, observers inte-
grate the evidence from the two pattern locations to a deadline,
after which the saccade is directed to whichever pattern triggered
the largest internal response.
Integration to threshold is currently the ‘‘gold-standard” model
of perceptual decision-making. It accounts for a wide variety of
behavioural data and is extensively supported by neurophysiologi-
cal evidence from the RDK paradigm. Before concluding that a rad-
ically different decision strategy was used in the contrast
discrimination task of Ludwig et al. (2005b) it is fair to demand a
more formal, quantitative examination of the integration to
threshold model.
This is all the more pressing, because in recent years the model
has been modiﬁed to include a deadline signal (Churchland, Kiani,
& Shadlen, 2008; Ditterich, 2006a, 2006b; Smith, 2000). The basic
idea is that the integrated decision variable is brought closer to
the response threshold as time elapses, even in the absence of any
sensory evidence in favour of one particular alternative. One instanti-
ation of this idea is that of a time-varying response threshold,
which is moved closer to the starting point of integration. The
qualitative deadline model put forward by Ludwig et al. (2005b)
may be seen as an extreme version of this idea, in which theboundary changes rapidly and early (see Fig. 2 and its description
below). The important point is that both the standard integration
to threshold model and the deadline model can be accommodated
within the same framework. As such, ﬁtting a time-varying thresh-
old model to the data from Ludwig et al. (2005b) may shed light on
the question of whether saccadic decisions in their paradigm were
indeed driven by a deadline signal.
In this regard, the data from Ludwig et al. (2005b, experiment 1)
have the potential to be extremely illuminating. The data set is
large, with the number of two-choice trials ranging from 4200 to
6200 across four observers. With accuracy around threshold (75%
correct) the distributions of erroneous responses were relatively
well-deﬁned. Latency distributions of correct and, especially, erro-
neous choices may be extremely informative and diagnostic with
regard to the underlying decision processes (Ratcliff & Rouder,
1998).
In the neural models applied to the RDK data (Ditterich, 2006a,
2006b; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Mazurek et al., 2003) a direct esti-
mate of the internal sensory response is available through the re-
corded ﬁring rates of MT neurons with the task-relevant
directional selectivities. These ﬁring rates are then used to com-
pute a decision variable, which is integrated over time downstream
(in lateral intraparietal area, LIP). As a result, the rate of accumula-
tion (or drift rate) is completely determined by the internal sensory
response. In the psychological domain, this internal representation
cannot be measured directly and the behavioural task is frequently
too complex to allow for computational speciﬁcation. As a result,
the accumulation rate and its variability across different trials are
free parameters. In other words, it is typically left unspeciﬁed what
the accumulated quantity actually represents. However, the noisy
luminance contrast stimulus sequence used by Ludwig et al.
(2005b) lends itself well to estimation of the momentary sensory
evidence: standard models of early temporal vision (for a review
see Watson, 1986, chap. 6) may be used to derive the internal sen-
sory response which forms the input into the saccadic system. That
is, as in the neural models described above, the accumulation rate
and its variability (over time and across trials) are completely
determined by the sensory response (Smith, 1995).
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Fig. 2. Model architecture. The visual input (time series of contrast values) is convolved with a single temporal ﬁlter. A transient (top pathway) and sustained (bottom
pathway) ﬁlter are illustrated; in the model ﬁts the degree of ‘‘transience” was varied systematically. The sensory representation is a temporally ﬁltered version of the input
patterns. An optimal decision variable is the difference between the noise-perturbed internal responses, where a positive difference indicates evidence in favour of the
clockwise pattern (the target in this example). Temporal integration of the noisy decision variable only starts when the sensory response to one of the patterns has exceeded
some minimum level, indicated by the dashed horizontal lines in the middle panels. A decision is made when the integrated decision variable reaches a boundary, where a
positive value indicates a clockwise response (the negative boundary is not shown in the right-hand panels, given the overwhelming evidence in favour of the clockwise
pattern). Three different boundaries are shown, which capture a standard, constant threshold model (dotted line), the deadline model proposed by Ludwig et al. (2005b,
dashed line), and a more gradual reduction in the threshold that may be regarded as a hybrid between these two extremes (dashed-dotted line). All different thresholds are
instantiations of the same underlying logistic function.
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Like the neural models described above, the model tested in this
study consists of a sensory representation, an integrator and a
decision rule. A schematic of the sensory representation and the
integrator is provided in Fig. 2. The precise mathematical details
of the model and the procedures used to ﬁt it to the data from Lud-
wig et al. (2005b) are given in Appendices.
The temporal noise stimulus is a sequence of contrast values
(Fig. 2—‘input’). The sensory representation of the two patterns is
a temporally ﬁltered version of the time series of contrast values.
There is a wealth of psychophysical evidence for the existence of
a limited number (generally estimated to be 2 or 3) of temporal
mechanisms (Breitmeyer, 1975; Fredericksen & Hess, 1998; Hess
& Snowden, 1992; Legge, 1978; Tolhurst, 1975b, 1975a). The re-
sponse of a transient mechanism peaks rapidly and then drops to-
wards baseline (Fig. 2—‘sensory representation’, top row).
Subsequent ﬂuctuations in the response are the result of the sto-
chastic nature of the stimulus. The magnitude of these ﬂuctuations
are the same for both the target and the non-target. As a result,
there is little information in the transient response beyond the ini-
tial burst of activity (Muller, Metha, Krauskopf, & Lennie, 2001). In-
deed, this is one explanation for the short integration period
observed by Ludwig et al. (2005b): if the saccadic system only
had access to transient mechanisms there would be little point in
integrating the input after the response has returned to baseline.
In contrast, a sustained mechanism will respond to the onset of
the patterns and then maintain this response at a relatively con-
stant, elevated level (Fig. 2—bottom row).In the presence of internal noise, a noisy response (sample)
from a visual mechanism can be probabilistically assigned to the
target or non-target category. The likelihood-ratio (Gold & Shadlen,
2001; Green & Swets, 1966) expresses the relative evidence an
internal response sample provides in favour of the target or non-
target being in the ‘‘receptive ﬁeld” of the mechanism (Eq. (B1).
With one mechanism response to each pattern, two likelihood-ra-
tios may be combined multiplicatively to form an optimal decision
variable.
To work out the probability of a noisy response having been
triggered by a target or non-target, the decision unit would need
to know about the expected mean internal response (at any given
point in time) as well as its variance, to both the target and the
non-target. In other words, it would need to know the probability
density functions of target and non-target induced responses. If the
brain was at all capable of extracting and storing such information,
it would need to build up its ‘‘database” over a large number of tri-
als. As argued by Gold & Shadlen (2001) it would seem unlikely the
brain would go through such efforts, especially because internal re-
sponses may be affected by a large number of factors (e.g. back-
ground luminance, spatial stimulus characteristics, etc.).
However, as outlined in Appendix B (Eqs. (B.2) and (B.5)) an
equivalent decision variable is formed simply by the difference be-
tween the two responses. The intuitive explanation is that under
conditions of equal variance, the larger the internal response the
more likely it was triggered by the target pattern. If the ‘‘anti-
clockwise” response of Fig. 2 is subtracted from the ‘‘clockwise” re-
sponse, a positive difference implies that the internal response to
the clockwise pattern was greater than that to the anti-clockwise
C.J.H. Ludwig / Vision Research 49 (2009) 2764–2773 2767pattern. As such, the clockwise pattern is more likely to be the tar-
get. A negative response difference implies the opposite: a greater
internal response to the anti-clockwise pattern, which is therefore
more likely to correspond to the target. The advantage of this
equivalent decision variable is that it does not require implausible
assumptions about the kind of information the decision unit has
access to.
The model assumes the difference between the noisy internal
responses is integrated over time at the level of the decision unit.
One additional option implemented in the current model is for
integration to start once the internal sensory response (to either
pattern) has exceeded some minimum level (Purcell et al., 2008).
The idea was that the early criterion could act as a gating mecha-
nism so that the decision unit only becomes engaged when the
sensorium is sufﬁciently excited. As it turned out, the sharp onset
in the visual responses coupled with relatively large amounts of
internal noise ensured that the sensory criterion is exceeded very
rapidly.
Temporal integration of the sensory evidence continues until a
boundary is reached. The temporal variation in the boundary was
modelled as a logistic function, allowing for the wide range of
boundary proﬁles shown in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure illustrates how this
function can approximate a nearly constant threshold over the
range of response latencies of interest (Fig. 2, right panels—dotted
lines). The deadline model proposed by Ludwig et al. (2005b) may
be approximated by a very sharp change in the threshold (dashed
lines). An intermediate, more gradual collapse in the response
boundaries may be regarded as a hybrid between these two ex-
tremes (dashed-dotted lines).
One important point to note is that the model in its current
form predicts the probability density of decision latencies. It is clear
that not the whole response latency period is taken up by integrat-
ing the sensory evidence. The overall response time is simply the
sum of the decision and a ‘‘non-decisional” delay. The latter is sub-
ject to its own (Gaussian) variability and is independent from both
the decision latency as well as the stimulus properties.
Table 1 lists the seven free parameters of the model. Best-ﬁtting
parameters were found that maximised the log-likelihood of the
observed choice and latency data. The ﬁtting procedures used are
described in Appendices C and D.3. Results
Best-ﬁtting model parameters were found for ﬁve levels of tran-
sience, f: 0 (purely sustained), 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1 (purely tran-
sient). The intermediate ﬁlters may be regarded as a weighted
combination of purely sustained and transient ﬁlters. Transience
was not treated as a free parameter because the goodness-of-ﬁt
as a function of transience was in itself of interest. That is, if models
with a predominantly transient ﬁlter consistently provide a better
account of the data, this would suggest a natural explanation for
the short evidence integration period (see Section 2). As it turned
out, better ﬁtting models lay at the sustained end of the spectrum,
with the purely transient model always resulting in the worst ﬁt.Table 1
Overview of free model parameters.
Parameter Description
n Gain of the temporal ﬁlter
h Boundary separation at t ¼ 0
m Location of the logistic threshold function
s Scale of the logistic threshold function
lnd Mean non-decisional delay
rnd Standard-deviation of non-decisional delay distribution
k Early criterion on the sensory responseHowever, there was some evidence of a moderate transient com-
ponent for observers 2 ðf ¼ 0:50Þ and 4 ðf ¼ 0:25Þ.
The model parameters are listed in Table 2. The corresponding
ﬁts to the distributions of correct and error saccade latencies are
shown in Fig. 3. Clearly, the model ﬁts follow the observed distri-
butions very closely and, by implication, the model accounts for
choice accuracy as well as latency. The model successfully captures
the shorter latency of erroneous decisions. Although fast errors are
a common empirical observation, accounting for the shape of error
latency distributions has been a critical test of models of choice
and reaction time (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).
The insets in Fig. 3 illustrate the variation of the positive re-
sponse boundary over time (the negative boundary is the mirror
image). It is clear that for 2/4 observers the threshold may be re-
garded as effectively constant (the abrupt change in threshold for
observers 2 and 4 occurred outside the data range). For 2 other
observers there is some evidence that the threshold changes dur-
ing an epoch in which it will impact on the decision outcome.
However, even for these observers the threshold does not begin
to approximate the abrupt deadline postulated by Ludwig et al.
(2005b).
Having optimised the model on the basis of the latency distribu-
tions and overall choice accuracy, its predictions regarding the
temporal weighting of the different luminance samples were
examined. Recall that Ludwig et al. (2005b) showed higher tempo-
ral weights for the ﬁrst 4–5 samples, corresponding to the ﬁrst
100 ms after display onset (see Fig. 1). Fig. 4A shows the results
from 1000 simulations of the model, using the median parameters
across observers. Each simulation involved a similar number of tri-
als as that used in the empirical study (5000). Logistic regression
was used to derive the temporal weighting function. Panel A shows
the mean weights, along with their 95% conﬁdence intervals. It can
be seen that these weights are signiﬁcantly greater than 0 for the
ﬁrst 100–125 ms. The model predicts that the very ﬁrst luminance
sample is given the largest weight. This is not consistent with hu-
man behaviour, as can be seen in Fig. 1. This discrepancy is not sur-
prising, given that the sharp onset in the visual response ensures
that evidence integration starts essentially from the beginning. It
is plausible that in humans there would be variability in the onset
time of integration, which would mainly affect the temporal
weight given to the ﬁrst luminance sample.
The same set of parameters were used to simulate a ‘‘critical
window” experiment similar to that reported in Ludwig et al.
(2005b, Experiment 2). Recall that observers were presented with
a mean luminance difference either just in the ﬁrst 100 ms of the
sequence (the early window), in the second 100 ms (the late win-
dow), or throughout the entire trial (baseline). The results seemed
intuitively inconsistent with an integration to threshold account.
Observers did not delay their decisions in the late window condi-
tion in order to wait for more useful sensory evidence. As a result,
accuracy dropped in the late window and overall latency remained
nearly constant.
The experiment was simulated 1000 times, with the number of
trials per condition set to approximately the same number used in
the original study (800). Fig. 4B shows the model predictions for
choice accuracy. There is a small drop in performance, relative toTable 2
Best-ﬁtting model parameters.
Observer n f h m s lnd rnd k
1 4.13 0.00 12.34 515.09 165.15 196.85 22.05 2.09
2 7.29 0.50 9.86 905.04 15.49 164.81 10.82 2.33
3 2.58 0.00 8.16 632.43 96.20 211.74 14.70 1.57
4 3.14 0.25 10.18 1000.00 0.01 182.93 12.54 1.38
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Fig. 3. Observed (histograms) and ﬁtted (solid lines) probability density functions of the latencies of correct (top row) and erroneous (bottom row) saccadic choices. The
insets show the variation in the (positive) response boundary over time for each observer.
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Fig. 4. Model predictions for the temporal weighting function (A), choice accuracy under critical window conditions (B) and saccade latency under critical window conditions
(C). The model was simulated 1000 times, each time with a similar number of trials as that used in the original experiments. A—logistic regression weights associated with the
noisy luminance samples. Error bars correspond to 95% conﬁdence intervals, because the critical comparison is between the data points and 0. B—predicted accuracy under
critical window conditions. The horizontal line indicates baseline performance. Error bars and the shaded region correspond to the standard deviation across the 1000
replications, because the critical comparisons are now between individual data points. C—predicted mean latency for the two critical window conditions. Error bars
correspond to the standard deviations across 1000 replications.
2768 C.J.H. Ludwig / Vision Research 49 (2009) 2764–2773baseline, for the early window condition. For the late window con-
dition performance is close to chance. Fig. 4C illustrates the latency
predictions. Overall latency increases only slightly in going from
the early to the late window condition (by about 7 ms. in this par-
ticular simulation). However, given the predicted variability it is
clear that this subtle effect will be difﬁcult to detect empirically.
The drop in accuracy for the late window and the near constant
overall saccade latency were the most salient aspects in the data
from Ludwig et al. (2005b).
Interestingly, the critical window position has striking and dif-
ferential effects on the latencies of correct and error decisions. Cor-rect latency increases for the late window condition, whereas the
error latency goes down. The reason for the predicted cross-over
is that for the early critical window a long integration period would
include more noise, thereby enhancing the likelihood of an error
decision. The reverse applies to the late critical window: a short
integration period would mainly include noise (or at least, rela-
tively less signal) and be associated with a greater likelihood of
making an error. This predicted cross-over was not reliably present
in the original data. However, note that the original critical win-
dow experiment was run on a different set of observers (bar one)
than the ones from which the parameters for this simulation were
C.J.H. Ludwig / Vision Research 49 (2009) 2764–2773 2769derived. In addition, the presence or absence of a cross-over de-
pends critically on the position of the decision boundaries (simula-
tions not shown here). This suggests that a critical empirical test of
the model should combine the critical window manipulation with
a variation in decision criteria (e.g. through speed–accuracy
instructions).4. Discussion
The model used in the current study relies on temporal integra-
tion of an optimal decision variable, derived from a temporally
blurred version of the stimulus sequence. A decision is made when
the integrated decision variable reaches one of two response
boundaries, which represent the two alternative saccade target
locations. In this sense, the model provides an integrated account
of the ‘where’ and ‘when’ of saccadic decisions (Findlay & Walker,
1999).4.1. Interpretation of model parameters
The model accounts well for the distribution of latencies of cor-
rect and error saccades, provided that the sensory representation is
derived from a relatively low-pass ﬁlter. Of course, in the context
of this particular task a sustained ﬁlter is sensitive to the most
informative components of the stimulus, namely the average con-
trast. Although far from conclusive, the ﬁnding that models based
on predominantly transient ﬁlters do not work nearly as well may
suggest that the spatio-temporal properties of the stimulus (low
spatial frequencies, relatively high temporal frequencies) did not
‘‘oblige” observers to construct their decision variable from a tran-
sient internal response. Taking the model parameters from the ﬁts
to the defective latency distributions, it naturally predicted a rela-
tively short temporal weighting function. Qualitatively correct pre-
dictions concerning choice and latency were produced for ‘‘un-
seen” data from a critical window experiment that was not used
to optimise the model parameters.
The ﬁnding that the model accounts for shorter-latency error
decisions is of particular interest. A diffusion model without
trial-to-trial variability in the drift rate and starting point predicts
correct and error latencies of the same magnitude (Ratcliff, 1978;
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Noise in the drift rate allows such a model
to account for long-latency errors, whereas noise in the starting
point of integration allows the model to account for short-latency
errors. Neither mechanism was included in the present model,
apart from the trial-to-trial variations in the drift rate produced
by the luminance noise in the stimulus. It turns out that the model
accounts for short-latency errors through its temporally blurred
sensory response. Unlike in the standard diffusion model where
the mean drift for any one trial is constant, the temporal ﬁlter en-
sures that the early sensory responses to both patterns are very
similar. Therefore, the emergence of evidence in favour of one or
the other alternative is relatively gradual (cf. Fig. 1). As a result,
the integrated decision variable hovers around the starting point
early on in processing. Given the considerable noise added to the
integrator, this is the ‘‘best” time for the integrator to end up at
the wrong boundary, producing an error. That is, once an internal
response difference emerges it is likely to point towards the target,
making an error response less and less likely.
Although starting point variability is an entirely reasonable and
plausible mechanism in any biological system, it is noteworthy
that the present model can account for short-latency errors with-
out including this form of noise. This explanation of short-latency
errors is reminiscent of the notion of ‘‘pre-stimulus sampling” of
Laming (1968), except—of course—that in this instance the 0-drift
period occurs after stimulus onset. Ratcliff (2002) simulated datafrom a model with a ramped onset in the drift rate and then ﬁt
the simulated data with the standard diffusion model that includes
starting point variability and assumes an instantaneous onset in
the drift. The ramped onset resulted in, among other things, an in-
crease in the estimated starting point variability, suggesting that
these different mechanisms may be difﬁcult to distinguish.
The model parameters indicate that a deadline signal may have
inﬂuenced decision-making for some observers, although this sig-
nal is far removed from the abrupt deadline proposed originally. In
the current model, the deadline signal was imposed on the re-
sponse boundary. In neurophysiological data from LIP, a deadline
signal was imposed on the activity of the neural integrator itself
(Ditterich, 2006a). Functionally and mathematically, a time-depen-
dent reduction in the boundary separation and an increase in the
integrated decision variable are equivalent (Smith, 2000).
It may be argued that the existence of some sort of deadline is
adaptive under conditions in which trials are terminated by the
perceptual response and a reward is collected (Ditterich, 2006a):
when the sensory evidence is weak there will come a point in time
at which it is better to make a guess and risk losing the reward for
that trial, in order to move on to the new reward opportunity pro-
vided by the next trial. Although no explicit reward scheme was in
operation in Ludwig et al. (2005b), some observers may have in-
voked a deadline signal to ensure they responded well within the
stimulus presentation time (1 s). Perhaps more importantly, inte-
grating sensory information from the peripheral ﬁeld for a pro-
longed period of time is quite unnatural behaviour: with limited
peripheral acuity it will, after some interval, be more adaptive to
actively inspect the peripheral region of interest with the high res-
olution fovea. The deadline signal that emerged under these condi-
tions may be the mechanism through which, in the natural world,
active visual exploration is promoted in favour of prolonged inte-
gration of degraded sensory information.
Interestingly, for the model to approximate the empirical data
the assumed decision latencies were relatively short (around
125 ms), regardless of the underlying temporal ﬁlter. Conse-
quently, the overall non-decisional delay typically made up
approximately half of the overall response latency. This is a puz-
zling ﬁnding: What is to stop the eyes from moving as soon as
the decision is made, apart from the relatively small efferent delays
to get the eye muscles in motion? These efferent delays are typi-
cally estimated to lie around 25 ms, based on micro-stimulation
of the superior colliculus (Robinson, 1972), frontal eye ﬁelds (Rob-
inson & Fuchs, 1969), and posterior parietal cortex (Thier & Ander-
sen, 1998). That said, in similar models as the one tested here non-
decisional delays of the same or even greater magnitude are by no
means exceptional (Churchland et al., 2008; Ditterich, 2006a,
2006b; Mazurek et al., 2003; Ratcliff, Cherian, & Segraves, 2003;
Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, & Segraves, 2007).
In the current models, it was important to assume some form of
variability in the non-decisional delay. As a result, variability in
saccade latency is not very tightly linked to variability in the deci-
sion latency on a trial-by-trial basis (Yang & McConkie, 2001). In-
deed, this was one of the major conclusions to emerge from the
original critical window experiment and the current, relatively
indirect, analysis underlines this point once more. One implication
is that current models of choice and response time still have some
way to go in providing a complete process account of response la-
tency. Instead of lumping the various non-decisional delays to-
gether in some parameter that is of relatively minor importance,
a complete model would include the computational processes that
give rise to the different delays. One critical question in this regard
is to what extent the processes that make up the non-decisional
delay really are not involved in the choice process (e.g. could there
be independent sources of noise that affect choice, even after the
‘‘decision threshold” has been crossed?).
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It is of course possible that the long non-decisional delay is sim-
ply a consequence of mis-speciﬁcation of the model itself, which
may have occurred at a number of levels. Take the sensory re-
sponse. First, temporal ﬁlter parameters were taken from previous
ﬁts to psychophysical detection data (Watson, 1986, chap. 6). It is
not clear whether the same parameters apply in the supra-thresh-
old domain. Then again, the ﬁnding of a long non-decisional delay
held regardless of the transience of the ﬁlter and also for a number
of different ﬁlter time constants (ﬁts not reported here).
Second, the visual ‘‘system” in the model is entirely linear: there
is no rectiﬁcation or non-linear transformation of the internal re-
sponses (Albrecht, Geisler, & Crane, 2003; Gorea & Tyler, 1986). Gi-
ven that the best models assumed a relatively sustained, elevated
sensory response there is no explicit need for rectiﬁcation. Non-lin-
ear compression or expansion of the internal response would pre-
dominantly affect the larger sensory response to the target. At the
level of the decision unit the effect of such non-linearities would be
to decrease (in the case of compression) or increase (in the case of
expansion) the mean drift in the decision variable. However, the
same effect(s) may be achieved by altering the gain of the ﬁlter:
e.g. reducing the gain would decrease the mean drift and therefore
increase the time it takes to reach a response boundary. In other
words, the effects of such simple non-linearities could have been
effectively absorbed by a different mechanism in the current
architecture.
At the level of the decision unit itself integration was assumed
to be perfect. Other models of decision-making assume leaky inte-
grators (Ditterich, 2006b; Usher &McClelland, 2001). Passive decay
or leakage in the integrator would act as a force to push its activity
back to baseline, thereby potentially prolonging the time it takes to
reach the response criterion. Leakage is typically included in mod-
els to prevent unlimited growth in the decision variable. In this
sense, leakage is difﬁcult to distinguish from the effects of more
transient inputs from upstream. Both a transient ﬁlter and leakage
produce a plateau in the activity of the integrator (although for dif-
ferent reasons—see top pathway in Fig. 2). Given this capacity for
transience to mimic leakage, it is likely that there is not much to
be gained from the additional inclusion of passive decay in this
particular model.
Both non-linear compression and leakage are natural mecha-
nisms to produce longer decision times. However, ultimately the
empirical data from Ludwig et al. (2005b) provide a strong empir-
ical constraint, which is not disputed here: whatever the internal
evidence integration period is, it has to correspond to only the
early section of the stimulus sequence. In other words, the inte-
grated decision variable at a late point in time (say, 200 ms) would
need to reﬂect at least partially the stimulus information presented
long before (say, 100 ms). In the current architecture there is only
one way to achieve this, namely by altering the temporal charac-
teristics of the ﬁlter so that it introduces this large an amount of
temporal blur. It is likely that the temporal properties of such a ﬁl-
ter would lie beyond the range of physiological and psychophysical
plausibility.
A more serious form of mis-speciﬁcation may have occurred at
the level of the model architecture itself. The main reason for using
a bounded diffusion model in this study was to test whether the
same type of model that successfully accounts for both neural
and behavioural data from the motion discrimination paradigm,
could account for saccadic decisions in a contrast discrimination
task. One alternative is to assume two accumulators, each coding
one response alternative, and integrating directly the sensory re-
sponse associated with that alternative. Such a race model does
not rely on the computation of net evidence (i.e. a response differ-
ence). Lateral inhibition between accumulators may be included toensure that evidence in favour of one response counts as evidence
against the alternative (Brown & Heathcote, 2005; Usher & McClel-
land, 2001). In this way, a competitive accumulator model may
approximate something that looks like the optimal decision vari-
able. At least for quick saccadic decisions it would seem likely that
such a rough and ready decision variable is quite adequate. How-
ever, it is well established that such accumulator models are difﬁ-
cult to distinguish from the bounded diffusion model on the basis
of behavioural data alone (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Co-
hen, 2006; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). More importantly, although it is
possible that a different—and in some respects neurally more plau-
sible—architecture would result in more prolonged decision times,
the same empirical constraint applies. That is, it is not at all clear
why a race model would produce longer decision latencies that
are still only based on the early portion of the temporal stimulus.
4.3. Conclusions
Ludwig et al. (2005b) presented what appeared to be a chal-
lenging data set for models that assume sensory evidence is inte-
grated up to a response threshold. They suggested saccadic eye
movement decisions were governed by a temporal deadline that
was not adjusted according to the quality of sensory evidence. This
radical departure from the prevailing view is not necessary: a time-
varying threshold model provides a good account for ‘‘seen” (Lud-
wig et al., 2005b, experiment 1) and ‘‘unseen” (the critical window
paradigm) data, provided a relatively low-pass temporal ﬁlter was
used to represent the sensory evidence. Importantly, the temporal
variation in the threshold, if present, was rather gradual and did
not resemble an abrupt deadline. Finally, it is important to note
that the aim of this study was not to prove that a particular model
of sensori-motor decision-making is ‘‘correct”. Rather, model
development here served to test the extent to which an empirical
data pattern was diagnostic with regard to the theoretical issue at
stake. Herein lies the major importance of specifying and ﬁtting
computational models of the decision-process.
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Appendix A. Temporal ﬁlter
At the sensory level, the time series of noisy contrast values is
convolved with a temporal ﬁlter to give the time-varying internal
response, r:
rðtÞ ¼ cðtÞ  hðtÞ; ðA:1Þ
where c(t) is the temporally varying stimulus and h(t) denotes the
impulse response of the temporal ﬁlter. This impulse response is
speciﬁed by a model of early temporal vision of Watson (1986),
chap. 6:
hðtÞ ¼ n½h1ðtÞ  fh2ðtÞ; ðA:2Þ
with
hiðtÞ ¼ uðtÞ½siðni  1Þ!1 tsi
 ni1
e
t
si ; ðA:3Þ
for i ¼ 1; 2 and uðtÞ is the unit step function. Each component of Eq.
(A.2), hiðtÞ, represents a cascade of n leaky integrators with a time-
constant s. The overall system function is the difference between
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ond ﬁlter, f, determines the transience of the system. A transient
system ðf ¼ 1Þ responds to a step input with a burst which then
gradually decreases down to baseline (Fig. 2 in the main text, top
pathway). A sustained system ðf ¼ 0Þ maintains its elevated re-
sponse to a step input (Fig. 2, bottom pathway).
The complete system function is speciﬁed by six parameters,
four of which were kept ﬁxed: s1 ¼ 6; s2 ¼ 8; n1 ¼ 9; n2 ¼ 10.
The level of transience was varied systematically:
f ¼ f0;0:25; 0:50; 0:75; 1g. The values of the constants were cho-
sen as they approximately match those that appear to account well
for a variety of basic phenomena in human early temporal vision
(e.g. threshold vs. duration functions; pulse-pair sensitivity Wat-
son, 1986, chap. 6). This choice reﬂects a prior belief that the same
mechanisms that serve human performance in such basic detec-
tion tasks form the primary input into the downstream saccadic
decision unit.
Appendix B. Formulation of an optimal decision variable
The following treatment is directly analogous to the analysis
presented in Gold & Shadlen (2001); the reader is referred to this
paper for a more detailed overview of the concepts involved. Con-
sider a pair of temporal ﬁlters – one ﬁlter for each pattern location
– with identical temporal properties, giving rise to two time-vary-
ing internal responses: rcwðtÞ and rawðtÞ, for the clockwise and anti-
clockwise positions respectively. These responses are subject to
internal noise, a 0-mean, Gaussian process. Let r0ðtÞ be the noise
perturbed internal response to a pattern.
Now consider a single, momentary sample from the two noisy
internal responses: r0cw and r
0
aw. The task of the decision mechanism
is to decide, given the two noisy samples, which response is more
likely to correspond to the target. Suppose the decision mechanism
knew what the expected internal response was in the presence of a
target or a non-target for this speciﬁc temporal sample, as well as
the associated variance. Let lT > lNT be the mean internal re-
sponses to the target and non-target, respectively, with equal vari-
ances: r2T ¼ r2NT ¼ r2int (internal noise here may be viewed as a
combination of the intrinsic noise within the observer and a ﬁl-
tered version of the external noise inserted in the stimulus).
For each internal response sample, the decision mechanism
may now compute the probability that sample was elicited by
the target or by the non-target. The likelihood-ratio gives the rela-
tive evidence in favour of two hypotheses (is this pattern a target
or a non-target?), given an internal response sample from that par-
ticular location:
LRT;NTjr0cw ¼
f r0cwjlT ; rint
 
f r0cwjlNT ; rint
  ðB:1aÞ
LRT;NTjr0aw ¼
f r0awjlT ;rint
 
f r0awjlNT ;rint
  : ðB:1bÞ
In Eq. (B1), f ðxjl; rÞ is the Gaussian probability density with mean
l and standard deviation r. Writing out f and taking the natural log-
arithm of both sides gives:
ln LRT;NTjr0cw ¼ 
1
2r2int
2r0cwðlNT  lTÞ þ l2T  l2NT
  ðB:2aÞ
ln LRT;NTjr0aw ¼ 
1
2r2int
2r0awðlNT  lTÞ þ l2T  l2NT
 
: ðB:2bÞ
The combined log-likelihood ratio across the two locations is now:
ln LRT;NTjr0cw ;r0aw ¼ ln LRT;NTjr0cw þ ln LRT;NTjr0aw : ðB:3Þ
Substituting Eq. (B2) into the right-hand side of Eq. (B.3) yields,
after some elementary algebra:ln LRT;NTjr0cw ;r0aw ¼ r0cw  r0aw
  ðlT  lNTÞ
r2int
: ðB:4Þ
Eq. (B.4) is the critical result: it says that the log-likelihood ratio of
the target being in the clockwise or anti-clockwise pattern location,
given a pair of internal response samples, is simply proportional to
the difference between the two samples:
ln LRT;NTjr0cw ;r0aw / r0cw  r0aw
 
: ðB:5Þ
In other words, the decision mechanism need not know about the
momentary expected internal response distributions, as the param-
eters of these distributions only enter Eq. (B.4) as a scaling term. In-
stead, the mechanism only needs to keep track of the difference in
the internal responses. A positive response difference indicates that
the internal response from the clockwise location is larger than that
from the anti-clockwise location. A negative response indicates the
reverse. Given the equal variance assumption, if one pattern trig-
gers a larger internal response than the other, it is more likely to
be the target. As argued by Gold & Shadlen (2001), even when the
equal variance assumption is violated Eq. (B.5) still provides a use-
ful approximation to the optimal decision variable.
The analysis so far dealt only with a single point in time. One
attractive feature of log-likelihood ratios is that they may be added
as more information becomes available. For instance, as time
passes the decision mechanism may collect more and more
momentary internal response samples r0. The continuous-time def-
inition of the noisy decision variable, D is then:
DðtÞ ¼
Z t
a
½rcwðxÞ  rawðxÞ þ gð0;rintÞdx: ðB:6Þ
In Eq. (B.6) g is the 0-mean Gaussian (white noise) process. The
noise is independently and identically distributed over time. In
the model ﬁt to the data, the lower integration limit, a depends
on when the magnitude of the internal sensory response exceeds
some critical value k.
Note that there is only one source of internal noise in the model,
although internal noise almost certainly exists at every stage be-
tween input and output. All the different sources of noise (e.g. neu-
ral and sampling noise at the sensory level; motor noise at the level
of the decision unit) are lumped together. As noted in the main
text, the standard diffusion model contains between-trial variabil-
ity in the drift rate as well as the starting point. Section 4.1 con-
tains a discussion of how starting point variability may be
mimicked by a gradual onset in the drift. Between-trial variability
in the drift, over and above the variability caused by the external
noise in the stimulus, could have been incorporated through noise
in the gain of the ﬁlter. In the context of the present data set it is
not clear whether the inclusion of additional noise sources would
have resulted in a signiﬁcant improvement in the goodness-of-ﬁt,
and—more importantly—alter the theoretical conclusions drawn
from the simpler model used here.
At this point the model is over-determined: an increase in noise
may be compensated for by an increase in the gain of the ﬁlter so
that the signal-to-noise ratio at the output of the ﬁlter remains
constant. It is customary to ﬁx one of these parameters. In the
model ﬁts reported here r2int was set to 1. The time step of the dis-
crete approximation was set at 5 ms.
Appendix C. Defective densities for correct and error responses
The model is a time-inhomogeneous diffusion process (Ditte-
rich, 2006b; Smith, 2000). The mean drift is speciﬁed by the instan-
taneous response difference between the two patterns. As a result
of the external noise in the stimulus, the exact pattern contrast val-
ues varied both across and within trials. Consequently, the mean
drift varied across and within trials. Thus, for any given trial the
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entirely speciﬁed by the internal responses to the two patterns,
which — in turn — depend entirely on the nature of the underlying
temporal ﬁlter (Eqs. A.1, A.2 and A.3).
To capture a wide range of possible temporal variations in the
response boundaries (from nearly constant to approximating a
step change), a logistic function was used to model the value of
the (positive) response boundary over time:
hðtÞ ¼ h0 1 11þ expððt mÞ=sÞ
 	
; ðC:1Þ
where m and s correspond to the mid-point and scale of the logistic
function, respectively. The upper starting point of the function is
speciﬁed by parameter h0. A nearly constant boundary may be
instantiated by a very large value of the scale s, so that the change
in the boundary is extremely gradual. Alternatively, a very sharp
deadline through a small value of s may occur at some late point
in time, outside the range of the observed latencies by setting m
to a large value (e.g. >1000 ms, as was done in the creation of
Fig. 2). The deadline model proposed by Ludwig et al. (2005b)
would correspond to a small scale coupled with a relatively early
value of m (e.g. 150 ms). The lower boundary, – hðtÞ, is simply a
negative copy of the upper threshold.
For a given set of parameters, the model predictions were de-
rived through simulation of 50,000 trials. For each of these simu-
lated trials two noisy contrast sequences were generated in
exactly the same manner as in Ludwig et al. (2005b, Experiment
1). Internal responses to the two patterns were corrupted by 0-
mean, Gaussian noise and the response difference between clock-
wise and anti-clockwise responses was integrated over time as
soon as one of the noise-perturbed responses exceeded the mini-
mum response criterion, k (as described by Eq. (B.6)).
For each simulated trial, the ﬁrst boundary crossing determined
the target of the model’s response and the time of the boundary
crossing was the decision time. The response was classiﬁed as cor-
rect or erroneous, depending on the (simulated) target position.
The simulated latency distributions of correct and error decisions
cannot be used directly to derive the probability density of the ob-
served response latencies, which is necessary for maximum-likeli-
hood estimation of the model parameters. As a result, the
simulated distributions were approximated with a Gaussian kernel
(Van Zandt, 2000).
Let T ¼ fT1; T2; . . . ; TMg be the ordered (from small to large) vec-
tor of simulated latencies of a particular response type (correct, er-
ror), containing M out of a total of N simulated responses. A
Gaussian kernel estimator provides an estimate of the continuous
probability density function underlying the simulated sample T:
f ðtÞ ¼ 1
Nh
XM
i¼1
 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p exp 1
2
Ti  t
h
 2" #
; ðC:2Þ
where h sets the width of the Gaussian averaging window according
to
h ¼ :51
N:2
min
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
varðTÞ
p
;
iqrðTÞ
1:349
 
;
where iqr denotes the inter-quartile range of the simulated sample.
To obtain the probability distributions of correct and error response
times, the decision time densities are convolved with a Gaussian
distribution of residual, non-decisional latencies:
gðsrtÞ ¼
Z
f ðtÞwðsrt  tjlnd; rndÞdt; ðC:3Þ
where srt is the saccade latency and w is the Gaussian distributed
non-decisional delay.Appendix D. Model ﬁtting
For a given set of parameters, the likelihood of each observed
response was computed from the appropriate defective density:
Li ¼ yigcorrectðsrtiÞ þ ð1 yiÞgerrorðsrtiÞ; ðD:1Þ
with y ¼ 1 and y ¼ 0 for correct and error responses, respectively,
and for i ¼ 1; . . . ;Nobs trials. The overall log-likelihood is then:
ln L ¼
XNobs
i¼1
ln Li: ðD:2Þ
An initial grid-search was used to ﬁnd a set of starting parameters
that produced reasonable predictions. Subsequently, a simplex opti-
misation routine (Nelder & Mead, 1965) was initialised with these
parameters to minimise the deviance (2 times the log-likelihood).
Each iteration of the algorithm involved the simulation of 50,000
choices. The random number generator seed was set to the same va-
lue for each simulation. Without this step the likelihood would vary
even when the model parameters are kept constant upon repeated
simulation. Such variation impedes convergence of the optimisation
routine.
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